If agents are ambiguity-averse and can invest in productive assets, asset prices can robustly exhibit indeterminacy in the markets that open after the productive investment has been launched. For indeterminacy to occur, the aggregate supply of goods must appear in precise con…gurations but the investment levels that generate these supplies arise systematically. That indeterminacy arises only at a knife-edge set of aggregate supplies allows for a simple explanation of the volatility of asset prices: small changes in supplies necessarily lead to a big price response.
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Dow and Werlang (1992) argued that ambiguity aversion can lead asset prices to be indeterminate. Ambiguity averse agents deem a set of probability distributions to be possible and in the maximin formulation evaluate their asset portfolios using the 'worst-case'distribution that minimizes their expected utility. With two states -an asset with either a high return or a low return -an agent whose initial endowment is state-invariant will evaluate an asset purchase using the distribution that assigns the highest probability to the low-return state and evaluate an asset sale using the distribution that assigns the highest probability to the high-return state. This switch of distributions as agents contemplate going long or short can lead agents to stay out of the market over a range of prices ('portfolio inertia') with the result that asset prices are indeterminate.
Epstein and Wang (1994) pursue a related line of argument.
These conclusions face a di¢ culty however: for most consumption bundles, agents will identify a single probability distribution as the worst-case and this distribution will remain worst-case for any small change in consumption. Locally, therefore, some or all of the agents in an ambiguity-averse society will have smooth indi¤erence curves and act just like classical expected utility maximizers. These agents, moreover, will determine the market response to price changes. For example, with one good in each of two states, an agent whose consumption varies by state will locally have just one worst-case distribution. As long as the aggregate endowment varies by state, there must be at least one such agent in any competitive equilibrium, and that is enough to ensure that equilibria are typically determinate. The case for indeterminacy therefore seems easy to dismiss.
These arguments appear in di¤erent ways in Epstein and Wang (1994) We take another look at asset pricing under ambiguity aversion by departing from the standard pure-exchange setting in which endowments are exogenously given. Instead agents will have the option of investing in productive assets that will endogenously alter the economy's state-by-state endowment of goods. It is then a robust event for equilibrium investment to occur at just the unusual levels that will lead to asset-price indeterminacy -in the two state case, the investment level that makes society's aggregate supply of goods constant across states. Asset prices will then be indeterminate, not in the overall intertemporal equilibrium but in the markets that open later, after the productive investment has been launched. 1 And the indeterminacy will be real: rather than displaying portfolio inertia, agents trade in equilibrium and consequently variations in equilibrium asset prices will change each agent's demand, consumption, and utility. The indeterminacy that arises endogenously lies in the class considered in Dana (2004) even though, as Dana pointed out, the indeterminacy is nongeneric in an exchange setting.
Investment robustly occurs in the special con…gurations that lead to indeterminacy due to the very fact that agents exhibit ambiguity aversion. In the two-state case, as an agent's consumption rises in the bad state where it is initially low, the agent will switch the probability distribution he or she uses to evaluate asset portfolios at the point where consumption becomes equal across states. Consequently the utility return to an investment that enhances output at the bad state will fall discontinuously at exactly the point where investment equalizes aggregate consumption across states. This discrete fall makes the special consumption-equalizing level of investment a systematic occurrence.
When there are more two states the same scenario can unfold where investment occurs at just the level that leads to indeterminacy, but now agents'consumption need not be perfectly hedged and can vary by state.
The knife-edge feature of the indeterminacy in this paper -that indeterminacy occurs only at particular investment levels -heightens its economic relevance: arbitrarily small changes in quantities will necessarily have a big impact on prices. Suppose we add a small amount of noise to the state-speci…c output of the investment technology. Although for almost every outcome of the noise indeterminacy will then be absent, asset prices will be volatile instead: if agents learn that there will be a small increase in the output of a productive asset at some state then -because of the switch in the probability distribution used to evaluate consumption portfolios -the price of assets with payo¤s that are weighted towards that state will fall discretely. The investments that ambiguity-averse agents undertake to hedge against uncertainty thus end up magnifying the uncertainty of prices.
Indeed, no matter how small the production noise is, asset prices will display nonvanishing variance. The volatility of asset prices is therefore much bigger than can be explained by the volatility of fundamentals -there is 'excess volatility'. In an economy of smooth expected utility maximizers, in contrast, a small amount of noise would lead to only a small variance in asset prices. We can therefore draw a bright line between the market equilibrium consequences of classical and ambiguity-averse agents.
The large price impact of small changes in quantities also means that agents will have a strong incentive to manipulate market prices. In the working-paper version of this article, we illustrate this point by showing that no matter how small an agent is as a fraction of the entire economy he or she can achieve a discrete utility gain by disposing of an arbitrarily small quantity of his endowment. A large economy of ambiguity-averse agents therefore cannot function competitively.
The distinctive character of the knife-edge indeterminacy that occurs with ambiguity aversion can be seen in a graph of the equilibrium correspondence (the map from exogenous parameters to equilibrium prices and quantities). For a two-state economy of agents with maximin ambiguity-aversion, Figure 1 pictures the map from some agent i's endowment of the good that appears at a state b to that good's normalized equilibrium price.
When i's endowment equals e i b then, given the …xed endowments of the other agents, the aggregate endowment of the state b good equals the aggregate endowment of the economy's other state-contingent good and indeterminacy is present. At nearby endowments equilibrium prices are unique. Although the endowment that leads to indeterminacy is rare we will see that it arises systematically. More importantly, small variations in e i b in the neighborhood of e i b necessarily lead to large changes in equilibrium prices; this feature of the model drives our volatility results. A discontinuity of prices is unavoidable due to the fact that the equilibrium correspondence does not admit a continuous selection in a neighborhood of e i b which in turn is due to the failure of the equilibrium correspondence to be lower hemicontinuous at e To sum up, it has long been clear that the Dow-Werlang no-trade argument does not by itself generate equilibrium indeterminacy or volatility; 'some other ingredient has to be inserted'in the words of Mukerji and Tallon (2004) . One way to …ll the gap is to let assets have an idiosyncratic component to their return that agents regard as ambiguous, as in Epstein and Wang (1994) and Mukerji and Tallon (2001) . Another way to use ambiguity to explain volatility has been to consider the e¤ect on equilibrium prices of a parameter such as a signal that can take on in…nitely many values (see Epstein and Schneider (2008) , Illeditsch (2011) , Condie and Ganguli (2011) ). With this second path, however, ambiguity aversion no longer plays a distinctive role. In a traditional general equilibrium model, if a parameter sweeps through in…nitely many values a point will come where a small parameter change has to induce a large changes in prices. Consider Figure 1 again or even the more orthodox case where the equilibrium correspondence is S-shaped.
In a family of in…nitely many economies, therefore, it is not surprising to …nd that at some point a small parameter change brings a big price response. The aim of this paper in contrast is to show indeterminacy and volatility can arise robustly in a neighborhood of a single model. The extra ingredient needed to deliver this goal is nothing more than the presence of a productive asset.
A simple economy
Although indeterminacy and volatility arise robustly in economies with ambiguity-averse agents, there are certainly some combinations of agents and technology parameters that lead to well-behaved equilibria where, in both the overall intertemporal economy and in the economy's later periods of operation, prices and allocations will be locally unique and change smoothly as a function of output levels. Since indeterminacy is not always present, there is no loss in turning to the simplest framework rich enough for asset price indeterminacy and volatility to be robust. There is a …nite set of agents I. Agent i 2 I is endowed with the quantities 0 of the three goods where
budget set is given by
Markets are complete in the standard sense that the span of the bundles that can be reached by trading the assets b and g equals all of R 2 .
Any model that satis…es our assumptions has an equilibrium. 
).
It is easy to con…rm, given the equilibrium (x Given an intermediate equilibrium, the price of any asset beyond our simple contracts that deliver output in one state only will be determined by q b and q g . For linear combinations of our simple contracts, indeterminacy along the equilibrium path will lead to an indeterminacy of the intermediate-period price of almost any asset in this class. 3 A set of intermediate equilibria E R 4I+2 forms a continuum if jEj > 1 and there is a continuous function f from some interval T R onto E.
Proposition 1 There are models where it is robust for all equilibria to be indeterminate along the equilibrium path.
To grasp why Proposition 1 is true, suppose for the moment that it is robust for agents in equilibrium to invest just enough to make the aggregate supply of output in the b state equal the aggregate endowment in the g state,
Consistently with (2) But why should it be robust for (2) to be satis…ed? As aggregate investment P i2I i 1 passes through the level at which (2) holds, at least some agents must switch from using the distribution with the highest probability of state b to the distribution with the lowest probability of state b. The resulting discrete fall in the utility rate of return on investment allows equilibrium investment to equilibrate systematically at the level where (2) obtains:
as the parameters of the model change slightly, the market rate of return can adjust to ensure that (2) remains satis…ed. The proof of Proposition 1 (in the Appendix which contains all proofs) will make this argument in greater detail. 4 See the subsection 'Two types of indeterminacy'below. 5 In the intermediate period, agent i can optimize by maximizing U i (x For some combinations of parameters the model will have equilibria where (2) is not satis…ed. To take an extreme example, P i2I e i g could be so large that even if all of the …rst-period good is invested,
, the supply of goods in the g state would still outstrip the supply in the b state,
The same inequality would also hold in equilibrium if the marginal utility of …rst-period consumption were su¢ ciently high. Under either scenario, some agent i must consume more in the g state than in the b state; since this i will evaluate consumption portfolios using the distribution i and locally will behave like a classical utility maximizer, intermediate equilibria will typically be locally unique.
Indeterminacy along the equilibrium path does not translate into indeterminacy of full equilibria. Suppose
is an equilibrium price ratio in the full intertemporal equilibrium that leads (2) to hold and that bations. This persistence makes it hard to argue that small parameter changes should have dramatic equilibrium consequences (the pattern we will see in section 4). In the Bewley model, the equilibrium correspondence is continuous and therefore, as Figure 2 makes clear, a small variation in endowments is consistent with price stability. One could posit that the prices selected from the equilibrium correspondence jump at some endowment point, but it would be hard to rationalize why markets happen to work in this way.
Unlike Figure 1 those jumps are not hardwired in.
To make the comparison to Bewley explicit, we simplify our presentation of maximin ambiguity-aversion. Let x i denote a vector of uncertain consumption for agent i, for
) in the intermediate period of our model, and assume that each i maximizes min 2P i E u i (x i ) for some set of distributions P i (where E denotes expectation calculated using the distribution ). If x i0 is strictly preferred to x i then x i0 must have strictly higher expected utility than x i calculated using any distribution that solves i's minimization problem when consumption equals
Therefore and hence the equilibrium correspondence will display the failure of lower hemicontinuity pictured in Figure 1 .
In contrast, an agent i with Bewley preferences is de…ned to strictly prefer (x
So a strict preference of a bundle x i0 over x i requires x i0 to have higher expected utility than x i calculated using any 2 P i . As a consequence there is a continuum of supporting prices at every consumption bundle, not just at exceptional bundles. If in addition at some consumption pro…le the agents in an economy have sets of supporting prices that robustly intersect, then indeterminacy is present: any vector in the intersection can serve as an equilibrium price vector (Rigotti-Shannon (2005)). Under mild restrictions the intersection will persist continuously as a function of parameters and we arrive at the continuous correspondence pictured in Figure 2 . The di¤erent continuity features of the equilibrium correspondences in Figures 1 and 2 explain why volatility appears readily in the maximin model: the failure of lower hemicontinuity in Figure 1 ensures that a small supply perturbation has to lead to a big price response.
General technologies The conclusion of Proposition 1 would not change if we were to let an initial-period investment As with (2), such investment levels can arise robustly. Assuming P i2I e i b 6 = P i2I e i g , the above equality will require that c b 6 = c g : investment must be able to change the economy's ratio of the state-contingent goods.
Indeterminacy with state-varying consumption The key prerequisite for indeterminacy is that each agent i consumes a bundle at which a continuum of probabilities in P i solves the minimization problem in (1) and where therefore indi¤erence curves are kinked. The simplest way to satisfy this condition is for consumption to be state-invariant in which case any 2 P i is utility-minimizing. But if there are three or more states then a continuum of solutions can also arise when agents are not perfectly hedged and consumption di¤ers across states.
For example, let the set of states be fa; b; cg, let a …rst-period good be consumed or used to produce the state a good, set endowments to be (e c ) = (2; 3; 4), i.e., when consumption varies by state. Moreover if the return to a unit of period 1 investment is greater than 2 and e i 1 is su¢ ciently large, the above agents will invest just the amount that leads to x i a = 2 and hence indeterminacy. 6 
Volatility of asset prices
We introduce a little uncertainty about productivity of the investment technology that translates the period 1 good into the state b good. The aggregate supplies of the state b and g goods then will almost never be exactly equal in the intermediate period. Although indeterminacy therefore disappears, asset prices will instead display nonnegligible variance no matter how small the investment uncertainty is. That the technological noise extinguishes price indeterminacy has the conceptual advantage that the resulting volatil- 6 It so happens in this example that indeterminacy will not appear robustly if there is more than one type of linear agent: with a one-dimensional set of minimizing probabilities for each agent any nonempty intersection of the minimizing probabilities across agents will generically consist of a single point. One way to repair this problem would be to introduce more states. ity tracks a real event (the outcome of the investment uncertainty) and hence cannot be interpreted as an artifact of attaching di¤erent equilibrium price vectors to di¤erent sunspots (see the discussion in Epstein and Wang (1994)).
To see the cause of volatility, suppose an equilibrium approximately equalizes the aggregate supplies in the b and g states and that agents discover in the intermediate period that the technological noise has led to relatively high level of output for the investment undertaken in period 1. Then the price of b must assume a small value (because agents when calculating expected utilities will use a low b ) as will the price of any asset whose payo¤ is weighted in favor of the b state. Conversely a small level of noise will lead to a discretely higher price for b . While this reasoning makes intuitive sense, there is still work to do; one must show that equilibrium investment will fall somewhere in the band where, taking the noise into account, the events where the supply of the state b good is larger and smaller than the supply of the state g good both have nonnegligible probability.
As we will see, the variance of asset prices has a positive lower bound even as the investment uncertainty becomes trivial; the model therefore exhibits excess volatility. The volatility is in fact bigger relative to fundamentals than for example in the Epstein and Fix a model ! from section 2 whose technology is described by the parameter e c. For each positive integer t, the technology parameter will now be a random variable c governed by a density h t on a support [c t ; c t ] (that is, h t (c) > 0 , c 2 [c t ; c t ]) where c t e c c t with at least one strict inequality. Agents learn the realization of c at the beginning of the intermediate period when they receive the proceeds of their …rst-period investment.
Outside of the investment uncertainty, every feature of version t of ! coincides with that of !. To let the noise shrink with t, we assume that c t c t ! 0. We thus have a model with technological uncertainty for each t, which we call a sequence of models with technological uncertainty. We also say that the sequence converges to !. We view h t as the density of the objective distribution of c since we are interested in the observable distribution of equilibria. Since we want to avoid any additional idiosyncratic ambiguity regarding the distribution of c that might be an independent source of volatility, we assume that all agents (unambiguously) believe that h t governs c. For each agent i, utility will be given by
The recursive structure of the above utility functions -in the initial period each i max- 
Under the alternative modeling option where each i maximizes
dynamic consistency would not obtain. There is however a 'rectangular' set of probability measures Q i de…ned on appropriate measurable subsets of fb; gg [c t ; c t ] such that a maximin agent with utility u i and the set of probabilities Q i will have the preferences represented by V i t and will in addition be dynamically consistent. See Epstein and Schneider (2003) .
Given a sequence of models with technological uncertainty and an equilibrium for each
, the variance of relative prices at t is given by
where the expectation E is calculated using the density h t . We de…ne asset prices for the sequence to be volatile in the limit if, for any sequence of equilibrium prices (p
does not converge to 0 as t ! 1. When asset prices are volatile in the limit, the ratio of the variance of asset prices to the variance of the fundamental c increases without bound as t ! 1. We focus on prices rather on other endogenous variables out of tradition; the volatility of prices will also lead the utility of agents to be volatile due to agents'trade in the intermediate period.
Let ! be a model from section 2. A property of a sequence of models with technological uncertainty that converges to ! is robust if there is an open neighborhood 0 of ! such that for any ! 0 2 0 the property holds for any sequence of models with technological uncertainty that converges to ! 0 . Since robustness requires a property to hold for any sequence of models that converges to any ! 0 2 0 , the h t densities that govern c are unrestricted; we could instead incorporate a h t into the de…nition of a model and let properties be generic only if they hold for all densities with a su¢ ciently small support.
Proposition 2 There are sequences of models with technological uncertainty where it is robust for asset prices to be volatile in the limit.
Our de…nition of equilibrium does not allow agents in the initial period to trade contracts that have payo¤s contingent on the realization of c. This modeling decision is the simpler and more plausible path but technically markets are incomplete. Fortunately the proof of Proposition 2 does not rely on this incompleteness. It is routine to de…ne markets for the continuum of contracts that completeness would require; if we did so then we could add 'whether or not markets are complete'to the end of Proposition 2. The motive for this quali…cation is that a classical economy of expected utility maximizers with multiple equilibria might show nontrivial volatility in the presence of technological noise when markets are incomplete: the realization of c could e¤ectively serve as a sunspot that determines which equilibrium plays out, thus allowing a randomization over the multiple equilibria. When markets are complete c cannot serve as a sunspot and then there is an unambiguous volatility di¤erence between ambiguity-averse and expected-utility economies. Alternatively, we could maintain the sharp divide between the two types of economies if we considered only expected-utility economies with a single equilibrium.
Conclusion
The seemingly unusual event that the aggregate supply of output falls into a con…gu-ration that generates indeterminacy occurs systematically with ambiguity aversion and intertemporal production. Ambiguity-aversion introduces a discontinuity in the rate of return on investment at just the points where investment results in indeterminacy; the discontinuity ensures that these particular investment levels arise robustly. That indeterminacy occurs only at speci…c output supplies gives it economic potency, which we have illustrated by showing that asset prices display a large reaction to small random events.
The indeterminacy considered here is a direct descendant of Dow-Werlang (1992) but there is an important di¤erence. In DW, agents are implicitly endowed with the same quantity of goods in the b and g states and will stick to that endowment, declining to buy or sell an asset over a range of the asset's price. As a consequence, asset price variations do not a¤ect demand or utility. In this paper, agents will typically have to With a di¤erent asset structure, we could get Dow-Werlang indeterminacy and port-folio inertia. For example, suppose that agents in period 1 can buy not only productive shares in the …rm but also assets that deliver claims on the state b and g goods. Each agent will then be able in his …rst-period trades to buy rights to his second-period con- 
satis…es the …rst order conditions,
then
2 ) and hence this vector solves i's optimization problem: conditions (6)- (9) state that the right (left) hand side derivatives of L w.r.t. 
Hence, by setting i < b i < i , inequalities (6)- (9) are satis…ed when (x
Let asset holdings be given by 8 Beyond the budget constraint, the other …rst order conditions that must be satis…ed when
Given the x i 2 determined by the budget constraint, the …rst condition above determines i . Since the remaining conditions are inequalities they will remain satis…ed for
g (!) (given access to the technology, each i could consume without trade), it follows that ! has a unique equilibrium. We omit the standard argument that if there were more than one equilibrium for some b
! in every open b containing ! then ! would have an additional equilibrium too.
We will show that there is an open set of models with ! 2 and a continuous function f from to an appropriately normalized set of prices such that f (!) is an equilibrium price vector for ! 2 and f (!) = p b ; p g . As we will see, (3)- (9) will remain satis…ed for a small enough neighborhood of ! and hence each i will in equilibrium consume the same quantities in states b and g. Indeterminacy of the intermediate equilibria will therefore continue to obtain. Since equilibrium is unique in a neighborhood of !, we conclude that it is robust for all equilibria to be indeterminate along the equilibrium path. Below, we indicate the dependence of a parameter on the model ! by the notation
, and so forth. We therefore need to show only that the Given the negative de…niteness of
2 ) and our assumption that if 
(So the previously mentioned function f : ! f1g R + is de…ned by f (!) = (1; p g (!)).)
To check that satisfying (10) leads to a full equilibrium, observe that by the budget constraints that de…ne B i , asset demands, which are now also functions of (p b ; p g ; !), must be given by
Given (10), summing the (13) equalities over i gives P 
is indeterminate for ! in the same neighborhood.
It remains to show that 
Proof of Proposition 2. In part 1, we construct an agent whose utility is maximized only when savings of the …rst-period good are at the level, e 1 x 1 , that leads secondperiod consumption in states b and g to be equal. Then in part 2 we show that if there were a set of I agents each with characteristics near that of and equilibrium prices were not volatile in the limit then there would have to be a solution to the problem of maximizing the sum of I copies of the utility that di¤ers from each agent saving e 1 x 1 .
Part 1
Let u be a utility meeting meeting our assumptions such that
is satis…ed for some (x 1 ; x 2 ) 0, b 2 (0; 1), and b c > 0. Let (e 1 ; e b ; e g ) satisfy e b + b c (e 1 We now let c be uncertain and note two easily con…rmed facts omitting their simple proofs. First, if e 1 (n); e b (n); e g (n); c(n); c(n) converges to e u (n)(x 1 ; e b (n) + c(e 1 (n) x 1 )) + (1 )u (x 1 ; e g (n)) dh n (c)
s.t. x 1 e 1 (n)
converges to x 1 . Second, it follows that the solution to the problem of maximizing the sum of I copies of the utility we have de…ned, ) .
Given (17), the last set above has at most one element and hence C has measure c t c t . ) . 11 We use U ) .
Now suppose that

